

Message Text

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ACTION SP-02

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8959
INFO AMCONSUL ADANA POUCH
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL POUCH
AMCONSUL IZMIR POUCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 7085

STADIS

FOR S/P DIRECTOR LAKE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, TU
SUBJECT: WEST EUROPEAN FACTOR IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY:
TURKEY

REF: STATE 216662

1. TURKISH THINKING ON THE ISSUES CITED IN REFTEL IS CONDITIONED BY THE CURRENT ESTRANGEMENT BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE US, BY TURKEY'S PURSUIT OF ITS OWN GOALS (PRIMARILY IN CONNECTION WITH ITS NEED FOR BROAD SUPPORT OF CYPRUS), AND BY THE DIFFERENCES IN OUR STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT. IN GENERAL, TURKEY CANNOT BE COUNTED ON TO SPEARHEAD COOPERATIVE MOVES WITH US ON ANY ISSUE AT INTERNATIONAL FORUMS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE CAN EXPECT THAT TURKEY WILL AVOID BEING AGGRESSIVELY UNCOOPERATIVE, ALTHOUGH IT MAY FROM TIME TO TIME TAKE OSTENTATIOUSLY INDEPENDENT COURSES. ON SOME ISSUES, POSSIBILITY THAT TURKEY MAY BE LOOKING FOR THE US GOVERNMENT TO TAKE A ROLE IN ARRANGING IMPORTANT FINANCING IN THE COMING YEAR TO EAST TURKEY'S CRITICAL
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FOREIGN PAYMENTS PROBLEMS COULD BE HELPFUL FACTOR.

2. THE TURKISH ATTITUDES ON THE ISSUES LISTED IN REFTEL ARE OUTLINED VERY BRIEFLY BELOW:

A. MAINTAINING THE ECONOMIC STRENGTH OF THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES: WESTERN EUROPE IS TURKEY'S MAIN MARKET. THE

EC-9 ALONE TAKES ABOUT 50 PERCENT OF TURKISH EXPORTS. TURKEY HAS A POCKETBOOK INTEREST IN THE STRENGTH OF DEMAND IN WESTERN EUROPE. TURKEY ALSO LOOKS TO WESTERN EUROPE FOR FOREIGN LOANS. IT WANTS TO EXPORT ITS SURPLUS MANPOWER TO GERMANY AND ELSEWHERE IN EUROPE AND KNOWS THAT BAD TIMES THERE REDUCE JOB OPPORTUNITIES FOR TURKISH WORKERS AND THEIR REMITTANCES HOME, AN IMPORTANT SOURCE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE. TURKEY WILL NOT BE A LEADER IN THIS ISSUE, BUT IT IS LIKELY TO SUPPORT MEASURES DIRECTED TO MAINTAINING THE ECONOMIC STRENGTH OF THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES.

B. LONDON SUMMIT GOALS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF NATO DEFENSES: TURKEY IS THE POOREST MEMBER OF NATO BUT DEVOTES A RELATIVELY HIGH PERCENTAGE OF ITS BUDGET TO DEFENSE. CONSISTENT WITH THIS POLICY, THE TURKS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE OTHER ALLIES TO IMPROVE THEIR DEFENSES. THEY WILL PROBABLY NOT BE PREPARED TO INCREASE REAL DEFENSE EXPENDITURES MEASURABLY SO LONG AS THE VESTIGES OF THE US ARMS EMBARGO REMAIN IN FORCE, BUT THEY HAVE IN RECENT YEARS BEEN ABLE TO KEEP UP WITH INFLATION ON INTERNAL DEFENSE SPENDING. UNTIL THE US-TURKISH DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT (DCA) IS APPROVED AND THE US MILITARY AID FLOW IS FULLY RESUMED, AND UNTIL OTHER NATO ALLIES ARE MORE FORTHCOMING IN ASSISTING TURKEY MILITARILY, THE RESOURCES TURKEY CAN ALLOCATE TO THE PROCUREMENT OF DEFENSE EQUIPMENT WILL BE STRETCHED. AT THE SAME TIME, THE TURKS APPEAR WILLING TO COOPERATE--BUT NOT

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TAKE THE LEAD ON--THE VARIOUS LONG AND SHORT TERM MEASURES PROPOSED AT THE LONDON SUMMIT FOR IMPROVING NATO'S DEFENSE POSTURE.

C. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION: TURKEY IS THE LAST, BUT ONE, OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES NOT TO HAVE RATIFIED THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. OFFICIALS INDICATE THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS IN FAVOR OF IT, BUT THE FACT REMAINS THAT IT HAS NEVER BEEN A HIGH PRIORITY ITEM WITH THE TURKISH PARLIAMENT.

THE GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED TO BUILD ITS FIRST NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, ALTHOUGH FINANCING PROBLEMS MAY DELAY THE START OF IT. IF TURKEY CHOOSES A US SUPPLIER FOR THE JOB OR SEEKS TO OBTAIN THE NECESSARY NUCLEAR FUEL FROM THE US--THE EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT WESTINGHOUSE HAS A BETTER THAN AVERAGE CHANCE TO GET THE REACTOR-CONSTRUCTION JOB--THE BILATERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES ON COOPERATION CONCERNING CIVIL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY WILL HAVE TO BE AMENDED TO PROVIDE FOR COOPERATION IN THE NUCLEAR POWER AREA, AND CONGRESS ALMOST CERTAINLY WOULD IMPOSE THE CONDITION THAT TURKEY RATIFY THE NPT. PROBABLY THE SAME CONDITION WOULD BE IMPOSED BY ANY OTHER COUNTRY IF ITS CONTRACTOR GOT THE JOB.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT TURKEY HAS MADE ANY EFFORT TO DATE TO ACQUIRE THE CAPACITY TO MANUFACTURE A NUCLEAR WEAPON. (IT HAS PRESENTLY ONLY ONE SMALL NUCLEAR RESEARCH LABORATORY, ALTHOUGH A SECOND RESEARCH REACTOR AT THE SAME SITE IS ABOUT TO BE BUILT.) IF THE GOVERNMENT DETERMINED THAT IT COULD NO LONGER COUNT ON A US COMMITMENT TO TURKEY'S DEFENSE, IT IS NOT INCONCEIVABLE THAT IT MIGHT SOMEDAY MAKE SUCH AN EFFORT. GREEK ACQUISITION OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPONS CAPABILITY MIGHT WELL PROMPT TURKISH EMULATION.

D. LIMITATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS: THE TURKS ARE ALSO LIKELY TO BE AMBIVALENT ABOUT RESTRICTIONS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS. AS A RESULT OF THE ARMS EMBARGO, CONFIDENTIAL

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THEY ARE PARTICULARLY AWARE OF THEIR DEPENDENCE ON OUTSIDE SOURCES FOR THEIR DEFENSE NEEDS AND OF THE VULNERABILITY OF THOSE SOURCES TO EXTRANEIOUS POLITICAL PRESSURES. TURKISH SUPPORT FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS WOULD NECESSARILY BE PREFACED BY REMOVAL OF REMAINING US RESTRICTIONS ON ARMS SALES TO TURKEY AND SOME ASSURANCE REGARDING CONTINUING ACCESS TO US MILITARY EQUIPMENT SUPPLIES, PLUS THE CONTINUED EXEMPTION OF NATO COUNTRIES FROM US ARMS EXPORT CONTROL RESTRICTIONS.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 ANKARA 7085

STADIS////////////////////////////////////

FOR S/P DIRECTOR LAKE

E. MTN: A DEVELOPING COUNTRY, TURKEY MAINTAINS MANY RESTRICTIVE MEASURES ON IMPORTS AS A MEANS OF RAISING REVENUE AND PROTECTING THE MARKET FOR DOMESTIC PRODUCTS. IT HAS, HOWEVER, A KEY INTEREST IN PRESERVING ACCESS OF ITS AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS TO FOREIGN MARKETS, SINCE TWO-THIRDS OF TOTAL TURKISH EXPORTS ARE AGRICULTURAL. IT IS ALSO TAKING SPECIAL MEASURES TO PROMOTE ITS EXPORTS, IN THE FACE OF AN ACUTE FOREIGN EXCHANGE SHORTAGE. THE US AND WESTERN EUROPE WOULD THEREFORE APPEAR TO HAVE CONSIDERABLE NEGOTIATING ROOM IN CONVINCING TURKEY TO REDUCE SOME NON-TARIFF AND TARIFF TRADE BARRIERS.

F. COOPERATION ON NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES: TURKEY MADE A DELIBERATE CHOICE SOME TIME AGO TO REMAIN A MEMBER OF THE OECD AND NOT TO JOIN THE G-77. GROUNDS FOR ITS DECISION WERE ITS OBJECTONS TO THE RIGID VOTING DISCIPLINE IMPOSED WITHIN THE G-77, CONCERN THAT MANY G-77 DECISIONS WERE MADE ON POLITICAL GROUNDS AT EXPENSE OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS, AND COMFORTABLE CERTAINTY THAT TURKEY COULD EXPRESS DISSENT WITH OECD POSITIONS WHENEVER IT CHOSE TO DO SO. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SOME IN THE MINISTRY OF CONFIDENTIAL

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS--ESPECIALLY AMONG YOUNGER OFFICERS--WHO URGE TURKEY'S ALIGNMENT WITH THE G-77, A RECENT HIGH-LEVEL MEETING IN ANKARA CONFIRMED THAT TURKEY HAD NO POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC INTEREST IN FOLLOWING IDEAS OF G-77 EXCEPT THOSE FEW IDEAS THAT MIGHT BE ESPECIALLY RELEVANT TO THE TURKISH LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT. (ANKARA 6582).

THE TURKS OFTEN FIND THEMSELVES ON THE FENCE IN MATTERS AFFECTING THE ARABS WHO SUPPLY TURKEY WITH OIL AND TO WHOM IT IS LOOKING--TO DATE WITHOUT GREAT SUCCESS--FOR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. ALTHOUGH TURKEY HAS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, IT GENERALLY SIDES WITH THE ARABS, AS FOR EXAMPLE, IT DID ON THE "ZIONISM-IS-RACISM" ISSUE.

G. PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO MAJORITY RULE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: TURKEY DOES NOT HAVE A STRONG COMMITMENT ON THIS ISSUE AND IS THEREFORE SUBJECT TO OUTSIDE INFLUENCE. IF MOMENTUM SHOULD DEVELOP AMONG THIRD WORLD STATES FOR A RADICAL, VIOLENT TRANSITION, TURKEY WOULD BE TEMPTED TO GO ALONG. ON THE OTHER HAND, TURKEY'S RELATIVELY CONSERVATIVE INCLINATIONS ON HUMANITARIAN ISSUES MIGHT KEEP HER ON THE SIDE OF EFFORTS FOR A PEACEFUL TRANSITION.

H. MIDDLE EAST: TURKEY MAINTAINS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH

ISRAEL AND SHARES THE GENERAL WESTERN SYMPATHY FOR IT AS A BELEAGUERED NATION. NEVERTHELESS, SHE FIRMLY SUPPORTS THE ARAB POSITION ON ALL MAJOR ASPECTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM, AND SHE WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO RESTRAIN ANY ARAB DIPLOMATIC EFFORT. SHE MIGHT COOPERATE WITH THE US IN LAST DITCH EFFORTS TO AVOID WAR, HOWEVER.

I. HUMAN RIGHTS: TURKS ARE WARY OF HUMAN RIGHTS AS AN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ISSUE, HAVING A WELL GROUNDED TRADITION OF CONFIDENTIAL

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SUSPICION OF OUTSIDE INTERVENTION IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS. THEY BELIEVE THEY HAVE A GOOD HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD--WHICH THEY DO-- BUT THE FACT THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS AND ARMENIANS HAVE BEEN FAIRLY SUCCESSFUL IN PORTRAYING TURKEY AS A GROSS VIOLATOR OF HUMAN RIGHTS MAKES THE TURKS VERY CAUTIOUS. THEY MAY BE COOPERATIVE BUT WILL NOT BE IN THE VANGUARD ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES.

3. EXCEPT FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF NATO DEFENSES, NONE OF THE ISSUES LISTED ABOVE IS OF PRIMARY INTEREST TO THE TURKS. WE BELIEVE THEY WILL SUPPORT FULLY THE LONDON SUMMIT GOALS. WE DOUBT THAT THEY CAN BE PERSUADED TO MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF ANY OF THE OTHER ISSUES--PARTLY BECAUSE THEY DO NOT SHARE FULLY THE OBJECTIVES, PARTLY BECAUSE OF A RELUCTANCE TO ANTAGONIZE ANY POTENTIAL SUPPORTERS, AND PARTLY BECAUSE OF A RELUCTANCE TO BE SEEN AS PART OF AN AMERICAN OR WESTERN EUROPEAN INITIATIVE. WHEN THE US AND TURKEY ARE ABLE TO COOPERATE BETTER FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE, AND WHEN THE POISON OF CYPRUS IS REMOVED, WE PROBABLY WILL FIND GREATER TURKISH ABILITY TO SUPPORT OUR OTHER OBJECTIVES.

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